Attacker establishing a PSRemoting session from a compromised system 10.0.0.2 to a domain controller dc-mantvydas at 10.0.0.6:
attacker@10.0.0.2
New-PSSession -ComputerName dc-mantvydas -Credential (Get-Credential) Id Name ComputerName ComputerType State ConfigurationName Availability----------------------------------------------------------------1 Session1 dc-mantvydas RemoteMachine Opened Microsoft.PowerShell AvailablePS C:\Users\mantvydas> Enter-PSSession 1[dc-mantvydas]: PS C:\Users\spotless\Documents>calc.exe
Observations
Note the process ancestry:
On the host that initiated the connection, a 4648 logon attempt is logged, showing what process initiated it, the hostname where it connected to and which account was used:
The below graphic shows that the logon events 4648 annd 4624 are being logged on both the system that initiated the connection (pc-mantvydas - 4648) and the system that it logged on to (dc-mantvydas - 4624):
Additionally, %SystemRoot%\System32\Winevt\Logs\Microsoft-Windows-WinRM%4Operational.evtx on the host that initiated connection to the remote host, logs some interesting data for a task WSMan Session initialize :
- <Event xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/win/2004/08/events/event">
- <System>
<Provider Name="Microsoft-Windows-WinRM" Guid="{A7975C8F-AC13-49F1-87DA-5A984A4AB417}" />
<EventID>6</EventID>
<Version>0</Version>
<Level>4</Level>
<Task>3</Task>
<Opcode>1</Opcode>
<Keywords>0x4000000000000002</Keywords>
# connection iniation time
<TimeCreated SystemTime="2018-07-25T21:13:36.511895800Z" />
<EventRecordID>673</EventRecordID>
# a unique connection ID
<Correlation ActivityID="{037F878B-8DF6-4F1A-BA51-432C3CDDCB47}" />
# process ID that initiated the connection
<Execution ProcessID="3172" ThreadID="2844" />
<Channel>Microsoft-Windows-WinRM/Operational</Channel>
<Computer>PC-MANTVYDAS.offense.local</Computer>
<Security UserID="S-1-5-21-1731862936-2585581443-184968265-1001" />
</System>
- <EventData>
# remote host the connection was initiated to
<Data Name="connection">dc-mantvydas/wsman?PSVersion=5.1.14409.1005</Data>
</EventData>
</Event>
...same as above just in the actual screenshot:
Since we entered into a PS Shell on the remote system (Enter-PSSession) , there is another interesting log showing the establishment of a remote shell - note that the ShellID corresponds to the earlier observed Correlation ActivityID:
Additional Useful Commands
Jules Adriaens reached out to me and suggested to add the following useful commands, so here they are:
# Enable PowerShell Remoting on the target (box needs to be compromised first)Enable-PSRemoting -force# Check if a given system is listening on WinRM portTest-NetConnection <IP>-CommonTCPPort WINRM# Trust all hosts:Set-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts -Value *-Force# Check what hosts are trustedGet-Item WSMan:\localhost\Client\TrustedHosts# Execute command on remote hostInvoke-Command <host>-Credential $cred -ScriptBlock {Hostname}# Interactive session with explicit credentialsEnter-PSSession <host>-Credential <domain>\<user># Interactive session using Kerberos:Enter-PSSession <host>-Authentication Kerberos# Upload file to remote sessionCopy-Item -Path C:\Temp\PowerView.ps1-Destination C:\Temp\ -ToSession (Get-PSSession)# Download file from remote sessionCopy-Item -Path C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop\test.txt-Destination C:\Temp\ -FromSession (Get-PSSession)
